House of Xi

Issue #374: I'm also turning my attention to China, mostly because I want to understand this country better. Last week, President Xi has reshuffled parts of the military leadership, and the interpretations are all over the map. I've read a few takes. Consider this the start of a public learning curve.

2026 is also a major election year across parts of Africa. The outcomes will still shape the lives of hundreds of millions of people, and the outside world mostly ignores these elections until something "breaks".

Also in this issue: I'm listening to a Yemeni maestro, while Pakistani-British Tariq Ali explains why the collapse of the Soviet Union was a "huge mistake", and reading about why many Muslims do not consider Kurds real Muslims. Plus, Japanese hip-hop, a Danish petition to "buy California", and so much more.

Talk soon,

China just removed its most senior general

What happened:
On January 24, President Xi Jinping removed General Zhang Youxia, China's highest-ranking active-duty officer and a long-time Xi ally, by putting him under investigation for "serious discipline and law violations." Another top commander, Liu Zhenli (operations, intelligence, training), is also under investigation. No real details are known so far.

Why this matters:
According to Cate Cadell and Christian Shepherd in the Washington Post, all real military power is now going to President Xi Jinping. This effectively wipes out much of the top military leadership: the Central Military Commission now has Xi plus the discipline chief as the only active members. The military reshuffle is described as the biggest since 1989, suggesting that Xi is willing to destroy his own chain of command in order to stay in control. This might not just be about "corruption", as these probes can also be used to remove rivals.

Tell me more:
Officially, the PLA Daily (the military's own newspaper) has accused Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli of violating the "chairman responsibility system," meaning they undermined Xi's command authority. This is the system that legally and ideologically guarantees that Xi, as party leader, has final control over the military. So, the official reason is "discipline/law," which usually signals corruption probes and typically ends in detention and dismissal. The BBC writes that this wasn't entirely surprising. There were rumors about this already; that's why both had missed a December meeting. Plus, there's been a long anti-corruption campaign. So, that checks out.

What other possible reasons are there?
There are several explanations.

Some outlets look at patterns. General Zhang was extremely close to Xi, was kept past retirement age, and survived earlier purges. His fall suggests the issue is not simple corruption, but power. The Economist writes, Zhang had become too powerful and looked like a potential political threat.

More analytical pieces focus on control. In China, whoever controls the military controls the state. Removing the last powerful general below Xi means Xi now faces no internal military constraint. Kathrin Hille in Taipei, Demetri Sevastopulo in Washington, and Joe Leahy in Beijing from The Financial Times write that the purge might also be directly related to Xi preparing for a fourth term in 2027. Did you know that the PLA has been the only institution that has ever challenged top party leaders?

Others focus on the military. The Economist believes it also has something to do with Taiwan. However, gutting the top command may weaken the military in the short term, especially as China talks more openly about Taiwan. The Washington Post writes older PLA leaders are described as more cautious about attacking Taiwan, and (perhaps this is why) Xi is described as preferring younger, more dependent commanders. The PLA was founded in 1927, and on its 100th anniversary, as the U.S. government writes, Xi wants PLA to be ready for a Taiwan operation; also, the Economist article suggests Xi is angry progress is not good enough.

Taiwanese outlets like Taipei Times focus more on the question of, "What does this do to China's ability to fight right now?" (as opposed to "What does this mean for Xi?"). Su Yong-yao, Lo Tien-pin, and Esme Yeh for Taipei Times write that Xi may deeply mistrust the military, including fear of defections during war. Hence, it is less likely to attack Taiwan soon because this news basically means that command structures right now are hollowed out, and loyalty seems to be uncertain.

All of these can be true at the same time. The reason coverage looks different is not necessarily disagreement over facts. It is very, very important to mention, as The Washington Post does, that China's military and political leadership structure is among the world's most opaque, leaving the full impact of the purges unclear. No one has full visibility. There is no on-record charge sheet. Thus, outlets fill the gap differently: some focus more on facts, others on power logic, and so forth.

Zoom out: Beyond the military, China is carrying out a record-breaking disciplinary purge across the government, punishing over 980,000 officials last year, according to official statistics quoted in The Washington Post. This number is the highest total since authorities began publishing such figures in the early 2000s.

Who was General Zhang?
Zhang was widely seen as Xi's closest military ally. According to the Taipei Times, Zhang is a "second-generation red", meaning a child of the first generation of China's Communist Party leaders. Zhang sat on both the Central Military Commission and the Politburo, serving as the most senior uniformed officer and the only person below Xi with system-wide military authority. For those in the U.S. or more familiar with their power structures, The Washington Post describes Zhang's role as a role that combined US-style defense secretary,...